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normalize extremist viewpoints.
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Suspicion Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate
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Abstract
This article considers the relationship between “hashtag activism” as it is
currently being used by the alt-right and the tendency to draw on conspiracy
theory that Richard Hofstadter identified as being prevalent among what he
termed “pseudo-conservatives” half a century earlier. Both the alt-right and
Hofstadter’s “pseudo-conservatives” can be characterized by a pronounced
populist nationalism that understands its aims as protecting a particular way
of life whilst drawing on an aggrieved sense of injustice at being conspired
against by an unseen enemy. That this “enemy” is typically foreign in
actuality or in spirit confirms the cultural dimension on which their politics is
played out. It is argued here that this paranoid populist nationalism has
been figuratively drawn upon in the rhetoric of Donald Trump and that this
apparent openness to the “pseudo-conservative” discourse on nationalism
has provided a bridging effect via which far right elements are seeking to
normalize extremist viewpoints.
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Kellyanne Conway’s phrase “alternative facts” has already passed into
notoriety; the Counselor to the U.S. president used the phrase when
defending statements relating to the size of Donald Trump’s inauguration
crowd made by former Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Blake 2017). Whilst the
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phrase was largely ridiculed by the “mainstream media” (MSM), their scorn
is unlikely to have had much impact on significant sections of Trump’s
support. Not only is the MSM trusted by less than a third of U.S. citizens
(Swift 2016), but there has been a resurgence of the acceptability of
conspiracy theory, or “the paranoid style” as it was described by Richard
Hofstadter during the 1960s. In his essay published in Harpers, Hofstadter
described the “dispossessed” feeling that characterized the right wing of
American politics in 1964. Indicative of the current state of political
discourse, half a century later Alex Jones, founder and frontman of the
conspiracy clearing house Infowars.com, claimed that he was one of the first
people that Donald Trump spoke to in his capacity as president (Haberman
2016). Trump has ridden a wave of populist dissent into the White House
and has done so using rhetoric drawn from recent conspiracy theory. The
conspiracy theories publicly embraced by Trump include the idea that
climate change is “a Chinese hoax” (Trump 2012), that Barack Obama is not
a U.S. citizen (Krieg 2016), Barack Obama as the founder of ISIS (Siddiqui
2016), vaccines cause autism (Trump 2014), and Muslims celebrated the
9/11 attacks en masse in New Jersey (Kessler 2016).1 This latter
convergence of conspiracy, ethnicity, and populist politics encapsulates the
scope of this article. This article will also examine the shared conceptual
spaces of populist politics, conspiracy theory and the role of the Internet in
1 It is worth noting Pasek et al’s (2016) study that connected belief in the “birther”
conspiracy with anti-Black sentiment.
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facilitating the mainstreaming of the paranoid style. By looking at far right
communications strategies within the conspiracy milieu, it will be shown that
the presence of conspiracy theories in the public sphere has allowed white
nationalist discourse to gain increased exposure. It should be noted that the
primary concern here is to concentrate on the effect on public discourse of
demonstrably untrue conspiracy theories. That these types of conspiracy
theories currently proliferate and determine much of the discussion should
not deflect from efforts to uncover the very real conspiracies that often
accompany statecraft and political maneuvering; Russian interference in the
2016 U.S. presidential election is testament to that. Rather, the focus here is
on those conspiracy theories that were formerly marginal and stigmatized
due to their lack of verifiability.

Theories of Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theory thrives in an environment of secrecy and necessarily
so. Without the possibility of there being a mechanism by which any plot
might be hidden there would be no opportunity to postulate the kind of
hidden malevolent plots that fuel conspiracy theories. So, secrecy and
conspiracy theories are not unrelated phenomena. Certainly, this is not the
only causal factor in the production of conspiracy theory but, in general
terms, a poverty of information can be understood to be productive of a
tendency to “fill in the gaps” in a simplistic and reductive manner. This is, in
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essence, the motive behind Fredric Jameson’s (1988, 356) well-known
description of conspiracy theory as “the poor person's cognitive mapping in
the postmodern age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late capital.”
In Jameson’s reading, class-based barriers to opportunity for knowledge
acquisition and the development of critical reason are the limiting factors
that reproduce information poverty. More typically, the extension of state
mechanisms for the production, classification, and suppression of
information are understood to be the primary factors in the development of
the current conspiracy milieu. Whilst this atmosphere of secrecy contributes
to a conspiracist tendency, as will be seen, status insecurity, fragile
economic wellbeing, and global economic developments also contribute.
Secrecy does not automatically produce conspiracy theories, or,
indeed, entail actual conspiracies. Daniel Hellinger (2003) quite rightly
describes a number of scenarios in which the use of secrecy by the state or
special interest groups may be required operationally, to facilitate frank
discussion, or to protect national interests. All of these may be pursued
legitimately in secret. However, they become conspiratorial when they
operate outside of agreed frameworks or subvert the democratic process
(Hellinger 2003). It should be noted here that conspiracy theorists can
perform a valuable role; their investigative skepticism offers a vital challenge
to the concealment or reduced circulation of information whilst also
challenging the assumptions that contribute to the definition of “the national
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interest.” As such, they can provide a means for redressing the
asymmetrical balance of power that state secrecy contributes to (Maret
2016). Conspiracies do happen and are facilitated by an opaqueness in
corporate and state business. It is easy enough to identify any number and
discussion of conspiracies in the field of U.S. politics would only be
controversial in selecting a single example over other possibilities: the
Tuskegee syphilis experiment, Project MKULTRA, the assassination of JFK,
Watergate, or the Iran–Contra affair might all merit consideration and bring
to light distinct forms of information control. In an environment in which
secrecy abounds, and in which conspiracies are shown to occur after the
fact, it should be unsurprising that the public is ready to speculate about
current conspiracies. However as Fenster (2008) points out, the proliferation
of conspiracy theories and the staggering diversity and likelihood of their
claims makes it difficult to assess the veracity of conspiracy claims. This, in
turn, allows conspiracy theory to serve multiple political ends as a result of
this indeterminacy: the hidden enemy is always secretly at work to
undermine and destroy “our” way of life and that “we” must stand together
to oppose “them.” Oliver and Wood’s (2014, 964) study of conspiracy theory
belief found that within the U.S. adult population:
Not only does half of the American population agree with at least one
conspiracy from a short list of conspiracy theories offered, but also
large portions of the population exhibit a strong dispositional
inclination toward believing that unseen, intentional forces exist and
that history is driven by a Manichean struggle between good and evil.
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The readiness to believe in a hidden, Manichean battle as a hidden
hand in the passage of history indicates a susceptibility to the kind of
manipulation via conspiracy narratives outlined by Fenster. Nonetheless,
Fenster (2008) situates conspiracy theory as a response to the development
of a monopoly on information and the production of “truth”; he is,
ultimately, a celebrant of the kind of agency that the production of
conspiracy theory offers. In this analysis, it is a way out of Jameson’s
information poverty motivated by a suspicion of the secret state. Fenster
(2008, 278 ) concludes his book with a narrative voice that is an unclear
convergence of his own and the narrator of the 9/11 “truther” documentary
Loose Change, a move he suggests is empowering to viewers bereft of their
own, clear voices, which
gives the viewer meaning and agency, and offers a sense of adventure
and fun as she attacks the stodgy, conspiratorial state with the latest
information technology and Web portals. And the conspiracy
community is the collective response that can rally the people and
restore the nation. The truth movement, composed of great scholars
and regular kids with laptops, can overcome.
Fenster captures the seductive power of contemporary conspiracy theory,
leaving open the possibility of a politically mobilized community of “web
researchers” enriching their cognitive maps and breaking down barriers to
“true” knowledge. As if in recognition of the lack of criticality, this ending
suggests an afterword that recognizes the limited opportunity for conspiracy
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theory to grow into a structured and productive politics that can, “organize
and respect people in the complex, diverse world that it simplifies” (Fenster
2008, 289).
Fenster makes an attempt to understand conspiracy theory as a
search for agency in an information economy in which access to knowledge
production is ostensibly limited, but can be extended and challenged by the
communicative strategies of the Internet. Fenster’s work, in its first edition
(1999), was an important intervention that captured a moment
characterized by an organic upswell of political awareness. Here Barkun
(2003) offers a useful summary of the value of the Internet to the
conspiracy theorist. Barkun highlights the value of an open medium of
communication that is free from gatekeepers to conspiracy theorists. Unlike
the MSM’s capacity to regulate and assess the quality of knowledge
production, the Internet offers conspiracy theorists the opportunity to
circulate their ideas freely without fear of their theories being dismissed as
spurious, “stigmatized knowledge subcultures are at a distinct disadvantage
as far as mass media are concerned […] Consequently, those whose
worldview is built around conspiracy ideas find in the Internet virtual
communities of the like-minded” (Barkun 2003, 13). Nonetheless, that does
not diminish widespread tastes for MSM treatments of conspiracy theory and
within the cultural sphere the entertainment industry has exploited a
generalized atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. The most significant
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recent works on conspiracy theory bear witness to this and Knight (2000),
Goldberg (2001), Barkun (2003), and Fenster (2008) all point to the
influence of the television series The X-Files (1993-) in expanding public
knowledge of conspiracy theory whilst drawing its popularity from an
environment of distrust. The stuff of The X-Files is standard conspiracy fare.
It depicts a complex and hidden world in which a shadow government
operated behind the scenes and conspired against its citizens and, in its
most dramatic sweep, humanity as a whole. The program’s slogan “The
Truth is Out There” featured in the title sequence, epitomizes the troubled
relationship with “the truth” that is currently experienced by the subject in
late modernity. The truth is “out there” in the sense that it is always
somewhere else, hidden in the general welter of the information, concealed
behind disinformation or hidden, restricted from the public. 2 For Goldberg
(2001, 256), this outlook typifies a historical moment in which an actively
maintained veil of secrecy separates state and citizenry. He describes “a cult
of secrecy [that] has dominated the bureaucracy in Washington and
distanced federal authorities from those beyond the beltway,” and that this
commitment to secrecy-in-the-name-of-security has proliferated and
accelerated in the post-WWII period so that its maintenance has now
become more “reflex” than “necessity” (Goldberg 2001, 256). Moreover,
this culture of secrecy has proven fertile ground for the genesis and growth
of conspiracy theory. In Goldberg's (2001, 257) words,
2 One X-Files episode was tellingly titled “All Lies Lead to the Truth.”
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Concealed information denied accountability and enabled the arrogant
both to ignore public opinion and to manipulate it. Behind this veil,
laws were broken and democratic values subverted […] Even without
the taint of malevolence, suppression of information aroused concern
[…] Drawing sustenance from America’s resilient fear of centralized
authority, perceptions of sinister design became truth.

This phenomenological correspondence between conspiracy and
innuendo is key here, especially where it is coupled with a population
increasingly disconnected from a central authority and experiencing
perceptions of social and economic disempowerment. Knight (2000) also
depicts a labyrinthine architecture of secrecy characterizing the American
state as it developed during the Cold War. He describes a “sprawling
intelligence community” comprised of “the CIA, the National Security
Council, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency,
Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the State
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy
Commission and the FBI” (Knight 2000, 28). Knight’s (2000, 29) reading of
this proliferation of the secrecy-oriented state is similar to Goldberg’s and he
finds that this “official obsession with secrecy, in effect, helped fuel the
popular fixation on conspiratorial secrets at the heart of government.”
Knight’s analysis suggests that contemporary America is experiencing a
“culture of conspiracy” in which the widespread intelligence community is
generative of a dispersed and generalized fascination with secrecy and
occulted machinations. As will be noted below, it is from this position that he
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dismisses Hofstadter’s narrow focus on conspiracy as being the purview of
extremists. Knight is right to draw attention to the extent that this culture of
conspiracy can be the groundswell from which a healthy critical mindedness
emerges. However, it should also be acknowledged that there is an
increased acceptance of a politics that was once considered to be extreme
but which, concurrently with conspiracy theory, is becoming increasingly
mainstream. As this article suggests, this concurrence is beyond
coincidence; it is a consequence of the extent to which far right usage of
conspiracy theory has become so thoroughly interwoven in the conspiracy
milieu as to ensure that an articulation of current conspiracy theories is to
evoke political positions on the extreme right, wittingly or not.
Conspiracy Theories and the Radical Right
The coincidence of belief in conspiracy theory and extremist politics is
widely noted in the literature (e.g., Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 2000, Gardell
2002, Goodrick-Clarke 2003, Durham 2007). Both tend to share an
apocalyptic structure in which communal ontologies are threatened by
external forces; typically, in both instances, these forces are hidden and
their threat to the extremist/conspiracy theorist’s community is realized
through secondary agents and secret plots. Richard Hofstadter’s scenesetting and frequently maligned essay “The Paranoid Style in American
Politics” paints a picture of the conspiracy theorist’s self-appointed role as a
protector of a world threatened by the machinations of hidden conspirators.
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/1
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Whilst there are conspiracy theories that can be seen to be written
from a left-wing perspective, it is the political right wing that has come to be
more readily associated with the production and belief in conspiracy
theories. This is not surprising. The political right are, generally speaking,
socially and culturally conservative with an ongoing association with
“traditional values” so the belief of a secret adversary – be it Satan,
communism, the Illuminati, the New World Order or whomever – that is
plotting to radically transform society’s values is a clear threat to a
conservative mindset. Here, then, conspiracy is understood as Barkun’s
recursive “super conspiracy” implemented to bring about an apocalyptic
endtime. This paper contends that the political extremity of white
nationalism seeks to play on the fear of an adversarial “hidden hand” in
order to provide a platform from which to normalize their politics of hate. In
this, Richard Hofstadter’s work is of continuing value in the analysis of far
right discourse and provides an explanatory model for understanding the
political right in the U.S. This will be done in the context of the use of the
Twitter hashtag “#whitegenocide.”
In 2011, Gary Kamiya wrote a piece titled, “The Infantile Style in
American Politics” for Salon. In it, Kamiya argued that Hofstadter’s essays
“The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt – 1955” and “Pseudo-Conservatism
Revisited – 1965” provided a way of understanding the Tea Party movement
within the Republican party. A year earlier the left-leaning conservative
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blogger Andrew Sullivan (2010) wrote a similar but shorter piece titled
“Trying To Understand The Tea Party II” for his blog. Both writers drew on
Hofstadter’s distinction between “pseudo-conservatives” and “genuine
conservatives” and this distinction will be useful to the current examination
of the right-wing populism evident in Donald Trump’s recent election and the
emergence of the so-called alt-right.
Not without controversy, Hofstadter’s two essays concerning the
“pseudo-conservative” political tendency in the U.S. give an account of the
nationalism and prejudice present within U.S. populism from the late
Nineteenth Century onwards. Foreshadowing current populist formations, he
identified a conspiratorial outlook within these populist movements. The
origin of the conspiracy was, typically, European bankers and, on occasion,
Jewish bankers working with foreign powers or for themselves. Hofstadter
identified jingoistic and anti-Semitic tendencies in the populist US People's
Party of the 1890s. His portrayal of them is complex but he was generally
well-disposed toward them, seeing them as “mild radicals” who targeted the
monied elites of their day. Although there was contestation over the extent
to which status anxiety was a motivating factor for the Populists (Collins
1989), in Hofstadter's analysis the primary motivation was economic anxiety
with status anxiety a secondary factor as is made clear in the
correspondence cited by Collins. Nonetheless, status anxiety is
acknowledged as being a contributory factor and Hofstadter expands upon
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the contribution of status anxiety to populist anti-intellectualism in the 1950s
in the essay “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt” (1955, in Bell 1963). The
prejudice described by Hofstadter in this essay has value to the current
discussion in its depiction of the American political situation of the 1950s.
The essay starts with Hofstadter reflecting upon the situation of a generation
that had been forged in the “liberal dissent” of the 1930s that had led to the
New Deal. Hofstadter suggests that by the time of writing this generation
had retained their liberal inclinations but had become politically
conservative; in a condition of relative affluence, they had a desire to retain
the advantages that the prevailing order provided them. He contrasts them
to the group he identified as the dominant radical force of the time, the
pseudo-conservatives. He draws on Adorno et al’s (1950) study of the
authoritarian personality.
Adorno and his co-researchers initially sought to determine causal
factors in an individual’s development of anti-Semitic beliefs but broadened
their concerns to try and understand the formative influences contributing to
a generalized susceptibility to an ethnocentric, authoritarian outlook. The
study is methodologically flawed (something Hofstadter acknowledges in the
later essay, “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited – 1965”), but it formulates an
emerging tendency in post-War US politics that, it is argued here,
characterizes the “right wing identity politics” of the alt-right and recent
formations within white nationalism. Adorno distinguishes between “genuine
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conservatism” and “pseudo conservatism” by characterizing the former as a
perceived protection of “positive” conservative values and a vision of
America as a land of opportunity for all within the terms of democratic
capitalism. The latter contains elements of that aspirational narrative but
they are overshadowed by a rigidly hierarchical ethnocentric framing of it. In
effect, opportunity is only available to certain in-groups. From Adorno (1950,
182),
The ethnocentric conservative is the pseudo conservative, for he
betrays in his ethnocentrism a tendency antithetical to democratic
values and tradition [...] his politico-economic views are based on the
same underlying trends—submission to authority, unconscious
handling of hostility toward authority by means of displacement and
projection onto outgroups, and so on—as his ethnocentrism [...] This
is not merely a "modern conservatism." It is, rather, a totally new
direction: away from individualism and equality of opportunity, and
toward a rigidly stratified society in which there is a minimum of
economic mobility and in which the "right" groups are in power, the
outgroups subordinate. Perhaps the term "reactionary" fits this
ideology best. Ultimately it is fascism.

The level of contestation over Hofstadter’s position on Populism
reflects the level of disagreement among historians about this movement.
Johnston (2007) outlines much of this discussion but asserts that Hofstadter
was correct to assert the presence of reactionary voices in Populism whilst
acknowledging that they sat uncomfortably alongside voices that were
forerunners of the Progressive movement that was to follow. Johnston’s
point is simple: that U.S. populism incorporates a variety of stances in its
criticism of the established order. Certainly, these stances include
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democratic perspectives that seek to promote the realization of the
aspirations of all Americans but, at the same time, anti-semitism and a
belligerent nationalism were also present,
[T]he Populist moment of the 1890s bequeathed to its various populist
successors a suspicion of elites and a taste for conspiratorial
explanations that have at times nurtured antisemitism and other forms
of bigotry. (Johnston 2007, 133)

More well-known and equally apposite here is Hofstadter’s study of
conspiracy theory “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” Effectively a
survey of conspiracy theory in American culture and politics and a brief
study of the John Birch Society (JBS), it shaped subsequent scholarly
discussion of conspiracy theory by situating the “paranoid” beliefs of the JBS
in a long-standing – if inchoate – tradition of alternative explanations for
social, political, economic, and cultural change. Like Hofstadter’s
commentaries on the differing modalities of conservatism this essay has had
a lasting legacy but has attracted criticism. Typical of recent criticism is
Fenster’s charge that Hofstadter pathologizes conspiracy thinking. Fenster
(2008, 8) suggests that Hofstadter contrasts conspiracy thinking with a
“healthy” approach to politics, and “he implied that conspiracy theory
constitutes a malady or affliction.” Despite his otherwise excellent study,
Goldberg (2001) goes further in this reductionist reading of Hofstadter; his
reading of “the paranoid style” is wholly grounded in the idea of Hofstadter
as a diagnostician. He writes,
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Hofstadter donned the white coat of a clinician. Conspiracy theorists
were marginal men and women whose personality disorders caused
them to project their problems, status grievances, and wounds into
public affairs. (Goldberg 2001, xi)

Goldberg continues in this vein and uses the language of a “clinician” to
emphasizes his charge against Hofstadter: “cure,” “contagious,” “infect,”
“fever.” This is all hyperbolic; this shibboleth needs laying to rest. Hofstadter
himself is careful to make clear he is not using the term in its full medical
sense but rather as an analogy suggestive of a tendency to identify
otherwise indiscernible threats to the “normal” run of things. It is
characterized by the conspiracy theorist’s production of fear of hidden
agency subverting a way of life. Hofstadter (1964, 77) is clear on his
avoidance of the medical implications that the term might otherwise
indicate:
I am not speaking in a clinical sense, but borrowing a clinical term for
other purposes. I have neither the competence nor the desire to
classify any figures of the past or present as certifiable lunatics. In
fact, the idea of the paranoid style as a force in politics would have
little contemporary relevance or historical value if it were applied only
to men with profoundly disturbed minds.

Nonetheless, despite this clarity caricatures like Goldberg’s persist.
Peter Knight’s (2000, 31) discussion of Hofstadter also confines him to the
clinical metaphor, insisting that Hofstadter produces a “diagnosis of a
thoroughgoing paranoid delusion,” and goes on to suggest that Hofstadter
“insisted” that the paranoid style is “a minority phenomenon” (Knight 2000,
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36), but again, this needs to be addressed because it undermines the
opportunity to draw on Hofstadter’s analysis in order to better understand
times to which it is suited, including our own.
Hofstadter does describe the “spokesman” [sic] of the paranoid style
as being marginal but here his ascription of a marginal status does not
downplay the seriousness of his discourse. This marginality is better
understood as being reflective of Daniel Bell’s (1963) suggestion that the
U.S. radical right represented a “dispossessed” constituency. As discussed
above, Hofstadter contributed essays on the “pseudo-conservatives” to Bell’s
collection; he also refers to Bell’s own essay in “The Paranoid Style in
American Politics.” Here, he is quite clear that the right wing tendency in
which he identifies a proclivity for the use of the paranoid style is subject to
social rather than psychological stresses, “but the modern right wing, as
Daniel Bell has put it, feels dispossessed: America has been largely taken
away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try to
repossess it” (Hofstadter 1964, 81). Thus, marginality in this instance
reflects a social status. It is worth quoting at length from Hofstadter in order
to restore this social dimension to understandings of his work in current
academic work on conspiracy theory. What is key in the following is that
Hofstadter does not condemn “the paranoid style” to the marginalia of
history but, quite correctly, acknowledges its capacity to command influence
in periods of generalized anxiety regarding social status or economic
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security. He writes that while a tendency to subscribe to a conspiracy view of
history may be seen to be,
[M]ore or less constantly affecting a modest minority of the
population. But certain religious traditions, certain social structures
and national inheritances, certain historical catastrophes or
frustrations may be conducive to the release of such psychic energies,
and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass
movements or political parties. In American experience ethnic and
religious conflict have plainly been a major focus for militant and
suspicious minds of this sort, but class conflicts also can mobilize such
energies. (Hofstadter 1964, 86)

It is clear here that Hofstadter, in his conclusion, is warning of the risk of the
spread of “paranoid rhetoric” from the perennial social margins into the
mainstream. In this he is not far off the analyses of the more recent
commentators who have, generally, sought to dismiss Hofstadter. Aupers
(2012) takes this tack and, without offering any evidence, introduces a
suggested Freudian dimension to Hofstadter’s undeserved reputation as a
diagnostician of aberrant political views. Aupers’ dismissal of Hofstatder’s
work typifies the recent tendency to attempt an ostensibly more considered
approach to conspiracy; similar approaches can be found in Knight (2000),
Fenster (2008), Robertson (2015). As such, it is worth exploring a little
further. Aupers’ argument is that Hofstadter’s diagnostic approach is
predicated on an assumption that conspiracy theory represents a dangerous
challenge to the consensus politics preferred by Hofstadter. Aupers (2012,
23) contends that Hofstadter, along with Daniel Pipes (1997) and Fredric
Jameson (1991) reflect “the ideology of modern Enlightenment,” and
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produce a simplistic and inaccurate division between the rational modern
subject and the irrational pre-modern alternative, echoing Weber’s
disenchantment thesis. Following Peter Knight (2000), he sees this as
approaching the status of a moral panic about the decline in public reason
and suggests that, instead, conspiracy theory reflects a more generalised
suspicion of authority and loci of power, “‘Paranoia’ is no longer simply a
diagnostic label applied by psychologists and psychiatrists but has become a
veritable sociological phenomenon” (Aupers 2012, 23).
This has become something of a common assumption in academic
treatments of conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theory is increasingly treated as
a commonplace disposition that typifies a diminished public capacity to apply
reason and a falling away in trust between citizens and the state. However,
within this, there are variations on this theme. Clarke (2002) considers the
“attributional error” implicit in conspiracy to have potential value with
conspiracy theorists’ activities creating pressure on state agencies to operate
in a more open manner. Indeed, the academy may do well to listen to his
suggestion that, “The conspiracy theorist challenges us to improve our social
explanations. If a nonconspiratorial social explanation is better articulated as
a result of the challenge of a conspiracy theory then that is all to the good”
(Clarke 2002, 148). However, he is wrong to diminish the risk that
conspiracy theories present. Clarke (2002, 148) suggests that "few are
actually harmful,” but it needs to be acknowledged that a conspiratorial
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theory of history was a contributor to the spread of anti-Semitism in Europe
during the early part of the Twentieth Century. Cohn (1966) and Bronner
(2000) provide a reminder of the influence of The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion had during the Nazi era. Moreover, in line with other works (Barkun
2003, Wilson 2017) Bronner underscores the continued utility to the far right
that The Protocols provides.
Following Michael Rogin’s (1967) earlier work, Fenster (2008) divides
academic commentaries on conspiracy thinking into two camps, symbolists
and realists. The division is organized around the idea that academic writing
about conspiracy theories generally serves two purposes: symbolists reflect
centrist countersubversion and realist interest in conspiracy theory lies in
delineating the ideological use of conspiracy theory by elite groups. Like
Rogin, Fenster describes Hofstadter as a symbolist and, rightfully, praises his
approach for situating conspiracy theories in their historical social, economic,
and political contexts but, tiresomely, does so in the “Hofstadter as clinician”
vein. Fenster (2008, 51) criticises realists for their, “too-quick dismissal of
conspiracy theory as a popular political practice,” and that their
concentration on the instrumental uses of conspiracy theory obscures the
initial circumstances that led to the politicisation of the advocates of
conspiracy theory in the first place. This is certainly true but, equally,
Fenster is overly hasty to err on the side of caution and extend the benefit of
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the doubt to conspiracy theorists in the name of open-mindedness. Fenster
(2008, 90) writes that
[C]onspiracy theories may be wrong or overly simplistic, but they may
sometimes be on to something. Specifically, they may well address
real structural inequities, albeit ideologically, and they may well
constitute a response, albeit in a simplistic and decidedly unpragmatic
form, to an unjust political order, a barren or dysfunctional civil
society, and/or an exploitative economic system.

This is undeniable but by constructing and then writing dismissively of
the so-called realist approach he diminishes the capacity to recognize that in
the overly simplistic forms that conspiracy thinking can take there is a
danger that the simplification produces potentially dangerous divisions within
society. Whilst Fenster is right to highlight the capacity for conspiracy
thinking to bring to light the grievances of a community it does not follow
that this necessarily legitimizes conspiracy thinking as a reasonable
response. As will be demonstrated, the danger in linking populism and
conspiracy theory that Hofstadter outlines does pose an opportunity for
potentially violent extremists to exploit and radicalize popular dissent.
Fenster is not alone in seeking to limit the perception of threat associated
with conspiracy thinking. Similarly, Knight (2000) plays down the adversarial
conspiracist outlook that Hofstadter delineated in pseudo-conservatives and
the John Birch Society. Instead, Knight (2000, 75) insists that what was
once the domain of the radical is now a mainstream reticence to extend trust
or belief,
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Paranoia is no longer necessarily the mark of right-wing demonological
extremism […] it has become a default attitude for the post-1960s
generation, more an expression of inexhaustible suspicion and
uncertainty than a dogmatic form of scaremongering.

Knight suggests that the populist, white right-wing forms of conspiracy
thinking had become dissipated and indistinguishable from those shared by
other social groups. He does this in a discussion of The Turner Diaries
(1978), a race war fantasy novel written by the founder of the National
Alliance, William Luther Pierce, under the pen name Andrew Macdonald. The
novel depicts a guerrilla war waged by white nationalists in a future in which
whites are routinely persecuted in a Jewish-run United States. Knight’s
analysis suggests that this is a response to the diminished position of the
white working class within an economic and political context that has made
equivalent the lives of all working people by destabilizing working class jobs
and creating an equality of precariousness. Knight (2000, 42) writes,
the increasing competition for diminishing social resources amongst
so-called minority groups leads to mutual suspicions between the
disinherited […] even the white Anglo male establishment now seeks
to redefine itself as an embattled minority interest group in the face of
a larger conspiracy group.

Furedi (2005) also embraces this model of an increased mainstreaming
of conspiracy theory as marking a particular mode of subjectivity. He frames
this as a crisis in agency, writing, “No one is as they seem. This
normalization of suspicion and mistrust does not possess any critical
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dimension. Agency panic represents the fear that the vulnerable subject
bears towards an incomprehensible changing world” (Furedi 2005, 86). What
is distinct in Furedi’s (2005, 86) analysis is that whilst he embraces the
generalised position he is still quite clear that conspiracy theory represents
an analytical failure, describing it as a “simplistic worldview,” that, “displaces
a critical engagement with public life with a destructive search for the hidden
agenda.”
Barkun’s (2003) detailed survey of American conspiracy culture in the
new millennium recognized this generalized mistrust of traditional
institutions and channels of communication. Nonetheless, whilst recognizing
that a conspiracy view of history is present on both the left and right wing he
is clear that how this outlook is made manifest is quite distinct in each
instance. So, for example, in a discussion of the shared aspects of New
World Order conspiracies he notes that those on the left are fearful of a
restriction of rights and freedoms whilst those on the right are more likely to
frame their conspiracy theories in terms of a direct persecution of
themselves and their political allies. Barkun (2003, 72) writes, “the right […]
became obsessively concerned with the risk of their own incarceration.”
The theme of persecution by a socialist “New World Order” is a wellestablished one on the right. Pat Robertson’s (1991) use of this theme is
well-documented and formed the basis of his book The New World Order.
The book spent weeks in The New York Times non-fiction bestsellers list
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during November and December 1991. This popularity led Michael Barkun
(1996) to describe it as one of two dominant factors behind the
mainstreaming of populist nationalist conspiracy theories during the 1990s.
The other factor he cited was the active presence on the Internet of the
Militia movement; in the case of the Militias, he observed the commingling of
conspiracism with Robertson’s millenarian apocalypticism leading to a
fervent urgency within their outlook. Thus, the conspiracism that was spread
by members and sympathizers of the Militia movement was marked by an
eschatological right wing outlook and it was this that characterized the
mainstreaming of conspiracy theory as an actual phenomenon as opposed to
the more general skepticism characterized by fictional forms such as The XFiles. Barkun (1996, 61) observed that “beliefs once consigned to the
outermost fringes of American political and religious life now seem less
isolated and stigmatizing than they once did.” This observation is developed
by Nigel James (2001) in a chapter examining the Militia/Patriot movement’s
use of the Internet. In this, he also draws on Zygmunt Bauman’s (1998,
1999, 2001) work on the erosion of prior sureties of identity by the
dissolution of closed cultural systems brought about via relatively easy
access to rapid intercontinental travel and global communications networks,
particularly the Internet. Like Oliver and Wood (2014), James notes the
tendency within the conspiracy milieu for conspiracy theorists and their
followers to exhibit a pronounced Manichaeism in their worldviews. Following
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Bauman, he suggests that this becomes coupled with a retreat into a
belligerent nationalism as a defense against the unbearable freedom to
endlessly recreate the self that characterizes postmodern identities. It is,
nonetheless, an ambivalent nationalism that accentuates loyalty to “the
nation” but this is qualified by the mistrustful antagonism toward the state
found within conspiracism. James (2001, 83) provides a useful reminder that
the recursive interlinking of websites and Internet-based methods of
communication produce a virtual proximity in beliefs that are otherwise
marginalised: “the occultist/UFO/Egyptologist/quasi-religious vortex of belief
systems [is] never more than a few clicks away from a neo-Nazi or Christian
Identity website.”

The Internet, #whitegenocide and the Radical Fringe
The Internet has provided an ideal medium for the dissemination of all
manner of stigmatized knowledge and provided fringe groups and beliefs a
potential audience that far exceeds the network of self-published magazines,
fairs and speaking opportunities that Colin Campbell (1972) described as
“the circuit” by which the cultic milieu recruited during the 1970s. Whilst the
content of the message being circulated may be analogous, the reach of
fringe voices via global communication media exceeds the audiences in town
halls and mail order publications by several magnitudes. Barkun (1996,
2003) raises this point, and returns to it in his consideration of the
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prevalence of conspiracy themes in Donald Trump’s campaigns for
Republican presidential candidate and U.S. President (Barkun 2017). In this
short essay, Barkun reinforces his earlier point regarding the capacity for the
Internet to amplify the voices of the bearers of stigmatized knowledge. He
points to the capacity the web gives for republishing the same material on
any number of platforms (or spamming as it is more usually called), also for
the Internet to provide those with a little technical savvy to present their
ideas in a polished manner that belies their fringe origins, and also the
opportunity for “securing pseudo-credibility” (Barkun 2017, 438) by being
linked to be a more credible, mainstream source. In particular, though, he
pays heed to the capacity for Web the 2.0 platforms such as Twitter and
Facebook to accelerate the process of what he calls “the mainstreaming of
the fringe” (Barkun 2017, 441). Barkun identifies the Trump’s use of former
Breitbart executive chair Steve Bannon as strategist in his campaign and
presidency as a clear sign of a more generalised acceptance of far right
fringe beliefs in the political mainstream; he describes Bannon and his
connection with the alt-right as providing, “a bridge to the fringe” (Barkun
2017, 440). He might equally have mentioned Trump’s conversations with
Alex Jones.
The Trump campaign was galvanized by support from the “alt-right”.
The alt-right is a relatively recent political formation within U.S. right wing
circles. Whilst sharing some of the social conservativism of the religious
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right, the alt-right is marked by a comparative youthfulness and a radicalism
in its racial politics. It is also marked by a nebulousness that prevents an
easy ideological mapping and it is notable that its amorphousness can be at
least attributed to its origins in the anonymous Internet message boards,
4chan and 8chan. There is a willed boundary pushing that tests freedom of
speech in a progressive liberal environment; “political correctness” is one of
the alt-right’s bugbears and the ludic nihilism of troll culture in 4/8chan has
been given some political grounding by the alt-right. In this, #Gamergate is
a clear precedent of the alt-right in its coupling of online trolling and
reactionary attitudes to gender roles. Similarly, the exhortations to
“transgress” made by Milo Yiannopoulos is clearly a targeted attack on the
liberal values that have influenced sections of the U.S. mass media and
national politics for the last decade. Although the rapid ascendency of the
alt-right has precluded the opportunity for an extended academic literature
certain thematic similarities have begun to emerge. Barkun (2017, 439) is
unequivocal in his description of the alt-right and notes that despite being “a
somewhat ill-defined label comprising white separatists, both anti-Semitic
and non-anti-Semitic.” Rosenfeld echoes this, but goes further in her
characterization of the radical nature of the alt-right incursion into the
mainstream. She views this fringe as proto-fascistic and a danger to the
future of the U.S., and writes, “Bannon regards his revolution - a ‘global Tea
Party movement’—as a quintessentially spiritual movement that will return
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the West to its ancestral ('Judeo-Christian') culture” (Rosenfeld 2017, 13). In
doing so she purposefully invokes Mussolini and her essay proliferates with
justified references to the Fascistic leanings and influences apparent in the
alt-right movement. Civil rights activists and the Southern Poverty Law
Center detail a number of the celebratory statements made by notable
figures on the alt-right in the wake of Trump’s victory (Piggott 2016). Many
of these are expressed in ethno-nationalist terms confirming the alt-right’s
grounding in diverse white nationalist groups.
As has been detailed elsewhere, one of the unifying cornerstones of
white nationalist ethno-nationalist is a millenarian conspiracism (Wilson
2012, 2017). Wilson (2017) provides evidence of the purposeful use of the
Twitter tag #whitegenocide by users of the white nationalist web forum,
stormfront.org. During the multiple ISIL terrorist attacks on Paris on the
night of November 13, 2015 forum members posted messages encouraging
readers to use the hashtag in tweets relating to the attacks. The messages
provide a clear account of white nationalist use of Twitter as a means of
amplifying their politics of hate by association with trending political events.
The phenomenon of hashtag activism has attracted some academic attention
and most of it has been laudatory in the strategic use of hashtags to counter
normative narratives of race, ethnicity, and racialized (in)justice,
predominantly on Twitter (Yang 2016; Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Cumberpatch
and Trujillo-Pagán 2016). Yang (2016, 15) also notes the capacity for the
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shared use of the #BlackLivesMatter to allow a creative communality of
shared experiences to join together disparate experiences of injustice
through a shared narrative form and, “create a collective story of struggles
for racial justice.” Bonilla and Rosa (2015) also note the collective endeavor
that links hashtag activists but also draw attention to the extended reception
these creative acts are afforded. Even though the replies and retweets may
have been challenging or critical, they note the capacity for the #Ferguson
to mobilize attention to ongoing and widespread injustice in America:
Within this context, social media participation becomes a key site from
which to contest mainstream media silences […] social media users
were able to show that “#Ferguson is everywhere”—not only in the
sense of a broad public sphere but also in the sense of the underlying
social and political relationships that haunt the nation as a whole.
(Bonilla & Rosa 2015, 12)

Quite rightly, Bonilla and Rose, as with Yang and others, point to the
potential for hashtag activism to disrupt normatively regulated flows of
information and to counter the institutional power structures represented by
the mainstream media. However, as Barkun (1996, 2003, 2017) has shown,
the open structures that allow the progressive use of the Internet and social
media also provides an opportunity for reactionary voices to attempt the
same. Thus, the communal effects of #BLM and the disinterring of concealed
racial “haunting” by #Ferguson are employed by the alt-right through
#whitegenocide and other white power hashtags.
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The following section explores current use of the hashtag and shows
how text mining Twitter can enhance understanding of the situated use of
#whitegenocide hashtag to further strengthen the bridge between the fringe
and the political mainstream as described above. Twitter’s popularity clearly
offers users a platform from which to address an extensive audience with
328 million monthly active users of whom 70m are American, this represents
just under a quarter (24%) of all online American adults (Statista 2017).
Although Twitter limits its archival database, text mining is able to
make use of resources made available through Twitter search APIs
(Application Programming Interface). In this instance, the free R statistical
environment (R Core Team 2017) was used for the analysis. Additional R
packages were used for Twitter API interaction (Gentry 2015), text mining
(Feinerer & Hornik 2017), topic modeling (Grün & Hornik 2011), and
visualization (Wickham 2009, Fellows 2014). 10,000 tweets using the
#whitegenocide were filtered using text parsing to remove common words
that added little to the character of the tweets (conjunctions, prepositions,
pronouns and so forth). A frequency matrix which was used to further filter
words used less than 100 times. From here a wordcloud was generated to
provide an at-a-glance reference of the 50 words most frequently used in
tweets flagged with #whitegenocide.
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At the heart of the wordcloud are the two opposing terms in the white
nationalist imaginary: white(s/ness/people/race) and diversity. The two
poles in the white identitarians’ Manichean divide between purity and
plurality. What is also striking is the presence of a number of prominent altright Twitter users: @wginfonetorg (White Genocide Info), @ladyaodh (Ann
Kelly “European rights activist”), @punishedrabbit1 (Jess Lynn, the number
“1” is omitted from the wordcloud as numbers are not included in the term
matrix), @savwhitechildre (SaveWhiteChildren). The latter is a clear
reference to the “14 words” of mystic white supremacist David Lane, “We
must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children”
(cited in Michael 2009, 43). The presence of these usernames among the
most frequently used terms indicates the capacity for individual users to
shape hashtag usage on Twitter. The audience reach of these users is also
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instructive. The following maps indicate the geographic distribution of the
followers of the three most overtly white supremacist of these users.

Map of followers for user White Genocide Info. Location of user
estimated from linked Web site registrar information.

Map of followers for user Kelly Ann. Location of user estimated from
linked website registrar information.
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Map of followers for user Save White Children. Location of user
estimated from linked website registrar information.

Although their locations are varied the three most notable
#whitegenocide posters all provide a link to a homepage offering white
supremacist propaganda. The distribution of their audience is broadly
comparable with roughly 70% of their followers based in the U.S. and in
the cases of White Genocide Info and Kelly Ann a European following of
roughly 18%. Save White Children has a slightly smaller European
following (11.8%) and a more pronounced South American following. It
must also be recognized that only a small percentage of their following
provide a geographic location and so the maps above are limited in their
scope. For instance, only 2.2% of Kelly Ann’s c.26.5 thousand followers
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provide a location that was identifiable by the R source code, TwitterMap
(Leek 2011). Nonetheless, the broad point is that if there is an equal
distribution of users providing geographic locations, in all three
instances their potential audiences are global.
The word cloud procedure was repeated with the usernames of the
individual removed from the term matrix. This brings a sharper focus on
the variety of terms most frequently associated with the #whitegenocide
as can be seen below:

Three of the five third tier terms (after the Manichean binary, “white”
and “diversity”) are hashtags: #WhiteLivesMatter, #StandUpForEurope,
and #MAGA. The first two are alt-right activist hashtags whilst the latter
is President Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again.”
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#MAGA is a close tie for the fifth most frequently paired term with
#whitegenocide. The following chart demonstrates the frequency
distribution of terms used in more than 200 #whitegenocide posts from
the sample.

Other frequently occurring hashtags include #tcot (“Top
Conservatives on Twitter”) and #pjnet (“Patriotic Journalists Network”).
The strategy here is clear. #whitegenocide is being repeatedly used in
proximity to more mainstream hashtags as a mechanical means to
effect the bridging from the fringe to the mainstream outlined above.
Trump is a clear conduit and it is no great surprise that he features in
the 50 terms most frequently associated with #whitegenocide. His
prevarications on matters of race and his relationship with the alt-right
have ensured that the bridge to the mainstream continues to be
available to the fringes of the right wing. A frequency analysis of terms
most frequently associated with #maga in the dataset of tweets
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featuring #whitegenocide shows the following to be the most frequently
associated terms:
tcot

whitepow

.58

.57

er

natsoc

ccot

trump

.56

.43

.41

altrig
ht

.40

hate

pjnet

.37

.33

There is a clear divide in these between overtly radical rights stances
and the more traditional conservative right but the location of #maga
and Trump vacillate between the two and are revealed as the bridges
between the mainstream and the fringe described in Barkun. For clarity,
these can be organized in the following table:
Traditional Right

Bridging
Terms

Radical Right

#tcot (Top
Conservatives on
Twitter)

#maga
(“Make
America
Great
Again”)
Trump

#whitepower

#ccot (Conservative
Christians on
Twitter)

(#)natsoc (National
Socialism)
#altright
hate

#pjnet (Patriot
Journalists
Network)

Echoing the division between “genuine conservatives” and
“pseudo-conservatives” made by Hofstadter, Barkun’s fringe increasingly
find ways into the mainstream of American politics and shift the
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discourse of conservatism in a more radical direction. As was indicated
above, in the conclusion of “The Paranoid Style” Hofstadter (194, 86)
warned of the susceptibility of the capacity for conspiracist rhetoric to be
“built into mass movements or political parties.” Wittingly or not,
Trump’s rhetoric has galvanized the radical right as they set their sights
on mainstream acceptance.
Concluding Comments
The compounding and expansion of state secrecy during the Cold
War and the War on Terror produced an era of mistrust and generalized
suspicion described by Fenster, Knight, and Aupers. Not unreasonably,
they signal conditional approval for the skepticism toward loci of
power/knowledge within the modern state and globalized corporate
entities that conspiracy theory represents; although their approval is
tempered by the more outré claims of fringe conspiracy theories.
Nonetheless, the dismissal of Hofstadter’s work as an operation in
clinical diagnosis has correspondingly resulted in an unpreparedness for
the exploitation of this “culture of conspiracy” by the radical fringe. It
should be noted here that conspiracies do exist and that conspiracy
theories are not the preserve of the political right. Covert actions are,
arguably, a necessary part of statecraft but their distinction from
conspiracies is determined only by the legitimacy of the power that is
exerted in their enaction. At the same time, fanciful accounts of the

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

37

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 1

secret exertion of power to achieve grand, malevolent ends abound.
What is of note in our moment is the spread of conspiracy theories into
the mainstream. In their turn to conspiracy theory, the radical right
have conformed to the “diagnosis” made by Hofstadter.
To return to Hofstadter’s article on the paranoid style, it is notable that
he dedicates a subsection to the paranoid spokesman’s habit of “Emulating
the Enemy.” Among the Ku Klux Klan, anti-Communists, anti-Catholics, and
anti-Masons’ reproduction of the tactics or organisational structures of their
perceived enemies, Hofstadter (1964, 85) also describes how “the John Birch
Society emulates Communist cells and quasi-secret operation through
"front" groups, and preaches a ruthless prosecution of the ideological war
along lines very similar to those it finds in the Communist enemy.” The
parallels with the alt-right’s reproduction of #BlackLivesMatter in its
reversed form as #WhiteLivesMatter is clearly a maneuver in this tradition
and might be understood to represent a desire to emulate and claim a
parallel creative community to the one described by Yang (2016). Although
this simple mimicry is more redolent of the fragile desperation with which
the alt-right seeks a consistent, communal “white” identity than it is of a
developed political strategy. Nonetheless, political progressives would be
well advised to dismiss the continued hashtag activism of the alt-right at
their peril. Whilst this article was being completed President Trump gave a
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public speech to a crowd in Warsaw, Poland ahead of the G20 Summit in
Hamburg, Germany. He told the crowd,
The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will
to survive? […] Do we have the confidence in our values to defend
them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to
protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the courage to
preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and
destroy it?” (Thrush & Davis 2017, §6)

Trump’s association with the alt-right leaves little room to doubt that
his “West” is a white West. His rhetoric is at once that of the paranoid
spokesman trafficking “in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political
orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the
barricades of civilization” (Hofstadter 1964, 82). Certainly, Huntington’s
(1993, 1996) clash of civilizations casts a long shadow over this rhetoric, but
in light of the enmeshed hashtags, the proximity of the alt-right to the White
House, and Steven Bannon’s strategic role, it is not unreasonable to suppose
there will be an audience for Trump’s words that hears not Huntington’s
influence in Trump's words, but that of William Pierce, David Lane’s 14
words, or #whitegenocide.
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